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1. Introduction
A Ponzi game allows the government to finance its spending through debt, not taxes. The
tax cut, other things being equal, increases the welfare. If public expenditures are produc-
tive, they can increase the growth rate and allow the realization of a Ponzi game. We
then have the situation where we “pay today’s public spending with tomorrow’s economic
growth.” We examine this situation. Literature on the subject leads us to clarify two issues.
McCallum (1984) showed that in the representative agent model, the government can
never play a Ponzi game (i.e. allow debt to grow at a rate above the interest rate) because
the representative agent never want to grow their loan at that rate. This is so because
the agent must satisfy the transversality condition. This means not accumulating capital
at a rate greater than r so that in an infinite time the present value of its capital is zero.
Tirole (1985), O’Connell and Zeldes (1988) showed that in the overlapping generations
(OLG) model, even if each agent satisfies its transversality condition (in this context, die
after consuming all its capital) it does not prevent the government from playing a Ponzi
game. Even if each individual satisfies its transversality condition, growth rate higher
than the interest rate (possible in this model), will mean that overall savings will grow
at a rate higher than r. The government has the opportunity to grow its debt at the
same rate as the economy. The result is a dynamic inefficiency which allows a Ponzi game.
Finally in this case of exogenous growth, public debt allows a Pareto improvement since it
will crowd out the excess capital. King and Ferguson (1993) showed that in models of
endogenous growth without learning-by-doing, the steady state is dynamically efficient
and Ponzi games are impossible. However, they show that when there is learning-by-doing
and when we use the OLG model, a Ponzi game becomes possible again, but this time in
a situation of dynamic efficiency. It follows that the Ponzi game will not lead to Pareto
improvement because capital is not over but rather under-accumulated. Unlike Tirole
(1985) and O’Connell and Zeldes (1988), the over-accumulation is no longer necessary for
the existence of a Ponzi game. To clarify, call γ the growth rate, r the interest rate and
rs the social rate of return. Learning-by-doing implies rs > r. Dynamic efficiency requires
rs > γ. Ponzi game is allowed if γ > r. In the case rs > γ > r a Ponzi game is possible in
situation of under-accumulation and does not produce therefore a Pareto improvement.
But the Ponzi game that King and Ferguson got (through learning-by-doing) is a resource
for the government that is not used in their model to finance productive public spending.
The assumption of productive public spending has been introduced into a growth model
by Barro (1990) under the assumption of financing these expenditures through taxes and
a balanced budget. Recently in the line of Greiner and Semmler (2000), an extensive liter-
ature has analyzed the long run effects of financing productive public spending by public
debt under different fiscal rules. Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004) classify the fiscal rules into
four types : i) balanced budget rules ii) deficit rules iii) borrowing rules iv) debt rules. For
example, the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU imposes a rule of deficit below 3% and
a rule of debt below 60%. Germany and the UK impose a rule of borrowing called “golden
rule of public finance” according to which borrowing can only finance public investment.
Under the golden rule Minea and Villieu (2008), show that financing government spending
by debt reduces the growth rate relative to tax financing. Bra¨uninger (2005) shows that
using an AK model, for a debt rule that fixes the ratio debt/GDP and spending rule that
fixes the ratio expenditure/GDP, there is a maximum threshold for the deficit ratio and
1
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the debt ratio. Yakita (2008) studied in this framework the golden rule and shows that the
sustainability threshold depends on the level of public capital. These works are dedicated
to the study of the sustainability of fiscal rules and show the negative effects on long
run growth of public debt. But this literature does not address the possibility of a Ponzi
game that would allow “paying today’s public spending with tomorrow’s economic growth.”
Our first objective is to construct a Ponzi game, which finances productive public
spending. As just explained, it is necessary to put in an OLG model where endogenous
growth is generated by the learning-by-doing and productive public spending. To do
this we first show that it is natural to introduce the learning-by-doing in Barro’s model
(1990). The purpose of this work is to show the effects on the welfare of productive public
spending financed by a Ponzi game. Section 2 gives framework of model. Section 3 gives
the steady state. Section 4 shows the possibility of a Ponzi game. Section 5 shows that
such a Ponzi game improves the welfare of each generation but deteriorates the welfare of
all generations. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
Consider the accounting government identity where r is the interest rate net of tax :
Bt+1 −Bt + Tt = Gt + rtBt (1)
We assume that the tax is proportional to GDP. We will express public spending and
debt as a proportion of GDP : i) Tt = τtYt, ii) Gt = ϕtYt, iii) Bt = btYt. Emphasize that
these are simple expressions of variables and not fiscal rules. Terms iii) is not a debt
rule and ii) is not a spending rule. In other words we do not assume that (τ, ϕ, b) are
constants as litterature cited in introduction. Dividing each member of the accounting
gouvernment identity by Bt, equation (1) can be written as an expression of the growth
rate of public debt in period t :
γBt =
1
bt
(ϕt − τt) + rt (2)
The only constraint for government is to be solvent in the long run in presence of
a positive debt. We assume that the government is solvent as long as the debt is not
growing faster than GDP. Thus, the solvency constraint (S) is : S ⇒ γB ≤ γY . This
budget constraint can be more or less binding for government depending on values of the
respective interest rate and GDP growth rate.
If r > γY , the solvency constraint requires the government not to play a Ponzi game
(NPG) : NPG⇒ limt→∞Bt(1 + r)−t ≤ 0⇔ γB < r. Indeed, if this ban is not respected,
we would have limt→∞Bt+1/Bt ≥ (1 + r). That would mean in the long run, that debt
would grow faster than interest rate, and therefore than the GDP (γB ≥ r > γY ), thereby
violating the solvency constraint.
If r ≤ γY , the solvency constraint is satisfied even if the government is playing a Ponzi
game. Indeed, suppose a balanced policy ϕt = τt ∀t (or perpetual deficit ϕt > τt,∀t) in
presence of positive debt B0 > 0, then from equation (2), we have γ
B = r (or γB > r).
We are in presence of a Ponzi game, while debt grows at a rate equal to the interest rate
(or higher). But the government can play this Ponzi game while remaining solvent since
γY ≥ γB = r (since γY ≥ γB > r).
2
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In conclusion, a Ponzi game is possible when the growth rate is higher than the steady
state interest rate of long run γ > r.
In Barro’s technology (1990) we introduce, as King and Ferguson’s result (1993),
learning-by-doing as in Romer (1986). The production function is :
Yt = AKt
1−βLtβkt
φgt
α (3)
Dividing by Lt we have yt = Akt
1−βkt
φgt
α. In addition to two private inputs, capital
(K) and labor (L), there are two externalities : On the one hand, public expenditure per
capita (g) and, on the other hand, learning-by-doing related to capital stock per capita
(k). Appendix (A) showns restrictions on the parameters, especially 1− β + φ+ α = 1
for endogenous growth. Note that for β given, an increase of α leads to a decrease of φ.
Any β ∈ max((α, ϕ), 1) can recover the Barro’s production function yt = Akt1−αgtα (see
Appendix B). Our production function is the same as Barro, where we exhibit β. This
brings learning-by-doing and determines the remuneration of labor which is essential in
OLG model.
We assume that capital depreciates in the period at rate δ. The firm’s profit after
tax is : (1− τt)Yt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt. In perfect competition, the wage rate equals the
marginal product of labor net of taxes and the price of capital equals the marginal product
of capital net of tax.
wt = (1− τt)PmLprivate = (1− τt) βAK1−βLβ−1kφgα = (1− τt) βyt (4)
rt + δ = (1− τt)Pmkprivate = (1− τt) (1− β)AK−βLβkφgα = (1− τt) (1− β) yt
kt
(5)
By internalizing learning-by-doing and public expenditure policy gt = ϕtyt, the ex post
production value is (see appendix C) :
Yt =
(
A
1
1−αϕt
α
1−α
)
Kt (6)
Using this ex post production value, we obtain the ex post remuneration values. To
simplify, we set Xt = A
1/(1−α)ϕt
α/(1−α)
and therefore, the interest rate is :
rt = (1− τt) (1− β)Xt − δ (7)
From the production function ex post (6) the social return of capital is :
rSt = (1− τt)Xt − δ (8)
Obviously, the social return of capital exceeds its private return because capital gener-
ates two externalities. The externality of public spending : the price of capital ignores
the fact that its contribution to production will expand the tax base and thus productive
public expenditure. The externality of learning-by-doing : the price of capital ignores the
fact that its contribution to production generates learning-by-doing.
The consumer behaves as in OLG model as Diamond (1965) without population growth.
Their utility function over two periods of life : (y, o) is : Ut = ln(c
y
t ) +
1
1+ρ
ln(cot+1). Budget
constraints when young (y) and old (o), are : cyt + st = wt and c
o
t+1 = (1 + rt+1) st. By
introducing first-order condition in constraints, we find consumption and saving :
3
2512
Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2509-2520
cyt =
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
wt c
o
t+1 =
1 + rt+1
2 + ρ
wt st =
1
2 + ρ
wt (9)
3. Steady state
First we suppose that there is no public debt and the government budget is always balanced
∀t, ϕt = τt. In competitive equilibrium, consumers maximize utility, producers maximize
their profits and markets are balanced. The labor market is balanced by assumption
Lt = Nt = N . By Walras law, it is sufficient that the capital market is balanced. At
equilibrium, we have : Kt+1 = St = Nst. Replacing st by (9), wt by (4) then dividing by
Kt, we obtain the competitive balanced growth rate. To be constant at steady state, we
must assume τt = τ and ϕt = ϕ we obtain :
1 + γ =
Kt+1
Kt
=
β(1− τ)X
(2 + ρ)
(10)
We found the Barro’s model growth rate, first increased and then decreased function of
τ = ϕ. The maximum is for τ = ϕ = α. In the case where α = 0, government expenditure
is not productive and growth is generated only by learning-by-doing. Then we have
1 + γ = βA(1−τ)
2+ρ
. Public expenditure only has a negative effect on growth through taxation
as in King and Ferguson (1993). The interest of our model is to introduce the positive effect.
Assume now that the government has a positive debt Bt > 0. At equilibrium, we have
Bt+1 + Kt+1 = St = Nst. In presence of debt, individual savings decreases (when the
tax rate is higher in presence of debt) and the aggregate savings must now also invest in
government bonds. In presence of public debt, there is a crowding out of capital which
reduces growth and, at a given date, the level of capital and production. Growth factor
is calculated for capital, GDP and debt ratio in appendix (D). At steady state we have
: τt = τt+1 = τ , ϕt = ϕt+1 = ϕ, bt = bt+1 = b et γ
K
t = γ
Y
t = γ
B
t = γ. Growth factors of
capital and GDP are :
1 + γY and K =
β (1− τ)X
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX)
(11)
It negatively depends on the debt ratio b. If b = 0, we find the expression level without
debt (10). At steady state, growth factor of Y and K must be egal to the growth factor
of debt. Using the equation 1 + γB from (2), we have the steady state condition :
β (1− τ)X
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX)
= 1 +
1
b
(ϕ− τ) + (1− τ) (1− β)X − δ (12)
This steady state condition is satisfied, given the level of the state variable b, only for
certain values in the pair of control variables (τ, ϕ), variables of economic policy. To solve
the model, we must consider that one of these two variables is given, and the other one is
endogenous. Assume that in the long run, the spending policy is given, ϕ is exogenous
and we solve the equation (12) for τ :
τ =
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX) (ϕ+ ((1− β)X + (1− δ)) b)− βbX
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX) (1 + (1− β) bX)− βbX (13)
4
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It is the expression of a curve, which gives tax rates for each level of debt, which
provides the steady state, given spending policy set. We see that without debt we find
τ = ϕ. Note that with debt τ is not alway greater then ϕ especially for low level of debt.
By replacing the tax rate that ensures the steady state in the expression of the growth
rate (11), we express the steady state growth rate only with exogenous parameters :
1 + γ =
βX (1− ϕ− b (1− δ))
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX) (1 + (1− β) bX)− βXb (14)
4. Ponzi game in dynamic efficiency
We show in this section that the economy can be described in the following situation :
rs > γ > r. In this case, a rational Ponzi game is possible, since γ > r, with under-
accumulation since rs > γ, and does not therefore allow Pareto improvement1. Our results
extend those of Wigger (2009) to a model of endogenous growth and those of King and
Ferguson (1993) to a model of endogenous growth with productive government spending.
To simplify the presentation, we assume δ = 1, as is usual, in an OLG model in which the
period is 30 years.
The economy is dynamically efficient if the capital stock is below the capital stock that
maximizes the steady state consumption per capita. It is c = (1− τ)y − (γ + δ)k and its
maximum is reached for (1− τ)f ′(k) = (γ + δ) where f ′(k) is the derivative of the ex post
production function (6). So this economy is dynamically efficient if (1− τ)X > γ + 1 so
if rs ≥ γ. From (8) and (11) the condition becomes 1 ≥ β/ ((2 + ρ) (1 + bX)), which is
always true for b ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 The economy is always dynamically efficient when debt is positive.
We have shown that a Ponzi game is possible if γ > r. By replacing the growth rate
and the interest rate by their expressions (11) and (7), then solving successively for the
various parameters, we obtain the following proposition :
Proposition 2 The government can play a Ponzi game if one of the following conditions
is satisfied : b < b¯, β > β¯, ρ < ρ¯, ϕ < ϕ¯, A < A¯ ou α < α¯.
The expression of the thresholds is in Appendix E. Assembling propositions 1 and 2,
the following corollary can be established.
Corollary 1 : The economy is dynamically efficient and the government can play a Ponzi
game if : i) the debt is not too large, ii) the wage share is large enough, iii) the time
preference rate is not too large, iv) public expenditures are not too large, v) the productivity
level is not too large, vi) the productivity of public expenditure is not too large.
To confirm ideas, we calibrated the model in Appendix F and show that the values of
parameters and thresholds that allow a Ponzi game in a dynamically efficient economy are
plausible. The condition i) is natural, a large debt reduced growth (it does not increase the
interest rate in this model) which reduces the possibilities of Ponzi game. The condition
1See King and Ferguson (1993) for the difference between the rate of social return and private return
in an endogenous growth model and see Wigger (2009) for the difference between gross return and net of
tax in an exogenous growth model.
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ii) is a characteristic of OLG model in which the young save on wages. A significant
share of wages in this model generates a strong accumulation and strong growth. Just
as increasing the share of wages reduces the interest rate, it increases the likelihood of a
Ponzi game. The condition iii) is explained conventionally because a large time preference
reduces savings and growth and thus the possibilities of a Ponzi game. Conditions iv) and
v) are explained in the same way : the spending ratio and the productivity level positively
involved in X = A1/(1−α)ϕα/(1−α) which itself comes in the denominator of the growth
rate. If ϕ is too high, growth is weak in Barro’s model which reduces the possibility
of a Ponzi game. The condition vi) seems paradoxical but is the important result of
our model. To understand we must remember the results of King and Ferguson (1993).
The possibility of a Ponzi game, King and Ferguson (1993) have shown, is related to the
importance of learning-by-doing. In our model, the more productive public spending,
the less learning-by-doing, when α increases φ decreases (see restrictions on exponent in
Appendix A), and therefore Ponzi game is less possible. This model provides an opposition
between productivity of public spending and the possibility of playing a Ponzi game.
This result goes against the idea that it is possible to “pay today’s public spending with
tomorrow’s economic growth.”
In the case considered by Diamond (1965), dynamic inefficiency and Ponzi game are
mingled and public debt crowds out the excessive capital and unambiguously increases
welfare. In our model the effect of debt on welfare is not so obvious. On the one hand,
there is no precedent positive effect, since in our model there is always dynamic efficiency.
On the otherhand, it was shown that a Ponzi game is possible, and therefore that public
spending can be financed by debt and not by tax. A small debt can reduces taxes.
5. Welfare with Ponzi game
We show in this section that at the steady state, the present generation is always interested
in a Ponzi game to fund public spending but that the next generation bears the burden
systematically. Debt improves the welfare of each generation but deteriorates the welfare
of all. The proof is the following: We show that the growth decreases in the presence of
debt even if it is a Ponzi game. There is a positive debt that reduces taxes and maximizes
the welfare of this generation and it is a Ponzi game. As debt reduces growth, the utility
of the next generation decreases. This generation will in turn increase its utility, with debt.
It follows that the rational Ponzi game is set up, but is not ultimately a Pareto improvment.
From the equation (14) we calculate debt that maximizes growth : ∂γ
∂b
= 0 ⇒ b˜ =
−2(2+ρ)−β(3+ρ)
2X(1−β)(2+ρ) . As ρ > −1 and β < 1 then b˜ < 0. Moreover we compute : limb→−∞
∂γ
∂b
= −1,
lim
b→+∞
∂γ
∂b
= −1, lim
b→0
∂γ
∂b
< 0. Thus, the economic growth rate is a decreasing function of
b for positive values of b. We conclude that growth decrease in the presence of positive debt.
We maximize the utility of agents of the generation born in t. Utility is Ut =
ln(cyt ) +
1
1+ρ
ln(cot+1). Substitute the consumption by their expressions (9), wage by (4),
assume kt = 1, then replace the tax rate by its steady state expression (13) the utility of
generation t can be written as a function of the debt ratio : Ut = ln
(
1+ρ
2+ρ
)
− 1
1+ρ
ln (2 + ρ)+
2+ρ
1+ρ
ln (wt [bt]) +
1
1+ρ
ln (1 + r [bt]). Differentiate this expression with respect to b and we
obtain : ∂Ut
∂bt
= − τ ′[bt]
(1−τ [bt])
(
2+ρ
1+ρ
β
(1−β) +
1
1+ρ
)
. This derivative vanishes for τ ′ [bt] = 0. That
6
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is to say for a debt level that minimizes the tax rate. When β ≥ β = 2+ρ
3+ρ
, the positive
solution is :
b∗ =
1
X
(
−1 +
√
β
(1− β)(2 + ρ)
)
≥ 0 (15)
There is always a positive debt ratio that reduces taxes and maximizes the utility of a
generation when β > β. It is easily verified that b∗ < b¯ so that debt is necessarily a Ponzi
game.
Proposition 3 The debt ratio b∗ that reduces taxes and maximizes the utility is necessarily
a Ponzi game.
The question now is, what will the next generation think of this debt ? To analyze this
situation, it suffices to consider the consequences of choosing b∗t by generation t on the util-
ity function of generation t+ 1. Ut+1 = ln
(
1+ρ
2+ρ
)
− 1
1+ρ
ln (2 + ρ) + 2+ρ
1+ρ
ln (wt+1 [bt+1, bt]) +
1
1+ρ
ln (1 + r [bt+1]). As in steady state, wages grow at rate γ, i.e. wt+1 = (1 + γt)wt), any
decrease in growth rate, reduces the utility of generation t + 1. As it was shown that
the debt reduces the growth rate, the generation t + 1 would have preferred that the
generation t does not play a Ponzi game.
Of course, following the reasoning that was adopted earlier for generation t, generation
t+ 1 will increase its utility also playing a Ponzi game (regardless of the debt made by
the generation t for bt ∈ [0, b∗]). The following figure helps to explain this result.
Figure 1: The debt dilemma
Suppose that at the beginning of the period t the debt ratio is zero. By funding public
spending only through taxes (τ = ϕ), generation t obtains utility measured at the point
A. Generation t can increase its utility by financing a part of public spending by a Ponzi
game (τ < ϕ). In this case the utility of this generation t is given at point B.
Regarding the generation t+ 1, the utility level depends on the choice of debt realized
by generation t :
If the generation t did not create debt, (curve Ut+1 (bt+1; bt = 0)) and the generation
t+ 1 adopts the same behavior, then, its utility is given in point D. But the generation
t+ 1 has an advantage to deviate and to create debt (point E).
7
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If generation t has debt b∗ (curve Ut+1 (bt+1; bt = b∗) ), generation t+ 1 maximizes its
utility by adopting the same behavior (point C).
We can conclude that generation t+ 1, like generation t increases its utility by creating
debt. Generalizing the above reasoning the dominant strategy for each generation is to
have debt.
Proposition 4 Each generation increases its utility by playing a Ponzi game b∗.
We consider the utility of any generation (t+ 1) at steady state. The dashed curve
on the figure gives the utility of generation t + 1 when it adopts the same behavior as
generation t :Ut+1 (bt+1 = bt). It represents the utility function for steady state debt.
Points D , E and C represent the dilemma of debt. Debt-free steady state, agents would
be in D, but this is dominated by the point E where each generation has an interest in
debt. All generations are then in steady state at point C. A steady state with debt b∗
reduces the utility level of D to C.
Proposition 5 The Ponzi game reduces the welfare of all generations.
The explanation of this dilemma is as follows : in this model, labor supply is inelastic,
the gross wage is determined by capital resulting of the savings of the previous generation.
The only way to have a higher net wage, is to finance government spending by Ponzi game,
so pay less tax. A debt that would not be a Ponzi game would involve a tax increase at
steady state. A Ponzi game decreases tax rate and increases net wage. The first generation
which finances public spending by a Ponzi game increases its utility. But transfer of debt
from generation to generation has a cost of crowding out capital, lower income and growth.
Thus the chronicle of net wages is lower, with a Ponzi game than without Ponzi game.
6. Conclusion
The Ponzi game improves the welfare of each generation but deteriorates the welfare of all.
Each agent pays less tax, but all have less income. As they may decide only the amount of
tax they pay and not the stock of capital accumulated through savings from the previous
period, they choose to pay less taxes when possible, ie when a Ponzi game is possible.
Ponzi game is possible when share of wages is high and the elasticity of public spending
is low, so when elasticity of learning-by-doing is high. This is the free learning-by-doing
that allows paying today’s public spending with tomorrow’s economic growth, not the
costly productive government spending.
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A. Restrictions on the exponents
Restrictions on exponents are : i) β ∈ (0, 1) i.e decreasing returns to scale in the private
factors and constants return to scale, ii) 1 − β + φ + α = 1 i.e constant returns on
accumulated factors, to obtain endogenous growth. This condition implie : α = β − φ,
β = α + φ, φ = β − α, iii) φ ≥ 0 i.e the learning-by-doing externality is positive or
null, iv) α ≥ 0 i.e public spending is productive. Deduced from these four restrictions :
Max(α, φ) ≤ β ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1− φ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1− α.
B. Equivalence with Barro’s production function
Indeed suppose β > α, such that β = α+ ε with ε > 0. The production function becomes
yt = Akt
1−βkt
φgt
α = Akt
1−(α+ε)kt
φgt
α = Akt
1−αkt
φ−εgtα = Akt
1−αgtα. Since α = β − φ we
have β = β − φ+ ε i.e ε = φ.
C. Internalization of learning-by-doing and public spending policies
Yt = AKt
1−βLβ(kt)
φ(ϕtyt)
α = AKt
1−β+φLβ−φ(ϕtyt)
α = AKt
1−α(ϕtYt)
α. Solving for Yt we
obtain 6.
9
2518
Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2509-2520
D. Calculation of growth factors
In Bt+1 + Kt+1 = St = Nst replacing st by (9) : Bt+1 + Kt+1 =
1
2+ρ
Nwt. Replacing wt
by (4) and dividing by Kt :
Kt+1
Kt
= 1
2+ρ
β Yt
Kt
(1− τt)− Bt+1Kt . By replacing the last term2 :(
1 + γKt
)
= 1
2+ρ
βXt (1− τt)− bt+1
(
1 + γKt
)
Xt+1. By solving, we get the capital growth
factor :
1 + γKt =
β (1− τt)Xt
(2 + ρ) (1 + bt+1Xt+1)
We deduce3 the growth factor of GDP :
1 + γYt =
β (1− τt)Xt+1
(2 + ρ) (1 + bt+1Xt+1)
Finally we obtain4 the growth factor of debt ratio is :
1 + γbt =
[
1
bt
(ϕt − τt) + (1− τt) (1− β)Xt − δ + 1
]/[
β (1− τt)Xt+1
(2 + ρ) (1 + bt+1Xt+1)
]
E. Thresholds for a Ponzi game
The government can play a Ponzi game when γ > r then if :
b < b¯ =
β − (2 + ρ)(1− β)
(2 + ρ)(1− β)X
β > β¯ =
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX)
(2 + ρ) (1 + bX) + 1
ϕ < ϕ¯ =
(
β − (2 + ρ)(1− β)
(2 + ρ)(1− β)bA 11−α
) 1−α
α
ρ < ρ¯ =
β
(1− β)
(
bA
1
1−αϕ
α
1−α + 1
) − 2
α < α¯ =
ln
(
β(ρ+3)−(ρ+2)
b(1−β)(ρ+2)
)
− ln(A)
ln
(
β(ρ+3)−(ρ+2)
b(1−β)(ρ+2)
)
+ ln(ϕ)
A < A¯ =
(
β(2 + ρ)ϕ
−α
1−α − (2 + ρ)
b(1− β)(2 + ρ)
)1−α
F. Calibration
The model is calibrated with the next set of parameters : A = 8; α = 0.2; ρ = 0.5; b =
0.02; ϕ = 0.2; β = 0.75. We obtain rs = 6.2035, γ = 0.831471, r = 0.800869. Dividing
by 30, the annual rate of social return is 20%, the annual growth rate is 2,8% and the
annual interest rate is 2.6%. The economy is dynamically efficiency and the government
can play a Ponzi game. With the parameters thus fixed, the thresholds are : A¯ = 8.70551,
α¯ = 0.321923, ρ¯ = 0.542482, ϕ¯ = 0.305176, β¯ = 0.746826 and b¯ = 0.0222285 so a
maximum annual value of debt ratio 66.7%. We note that the values of parameters and
thresholds that allow a Ponzi game under dynamic efficiency are plausible.
2Bt+1
Kt
= Bt+1Yt+1
Yt+1
Yt
Yt
Kt
= bt+1
(
1 + γYt
)
Yt
Kt
= bt+1
((
1 + γKt
) Xt+1
Xt
)
Xt = bt+1
(
1 + γKt
)
Xt+1
3Since Xt =
Yt
Kt
we have :
(
1 + γXt
)
=
(1+γYt )
(1+γKt )
= Xt+1Xt
4Since bt =
Bt
Yt
we have :
(
1 + γbt
)
=
(1+γBt )
(1+γYt )
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G. Mathematical notations
Lowercase variables y, k, s, g are per capita.
Y : GDP
K : Capital stock
L : Labor
A : Productivity level
B : Public debt
G : Public spending
S : Saving
N : Number of agents in each generation
α : Elasticity of the externality of public spending
β : Elasticity of Labor
φ : Elasticity of capital externality in the production of learning-by-doing
δ : Depreciation rate of capital
ρ : Time preference rate
γ : Growth rate
τ : Tax rate
ϕ : Public spending to GDP ratio
b : Public debt to GDP ratio
cyt : Consumption when young
cot : Consumption when old
r : Interest rate
rs : Social rate of return on capital
w : Wage rate.
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